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Abstract Attribute-based credentials (ABCs) are an important build-
ing block of privacy-enhancing identity management. Since non-identifying
attributes can easily be abused as the anonymity they provide hides
the perpetrator, cryptographic mechanisms need to be introduced to
make them revocable. However, most of these techniques are not effi-
cient enough in practice.
ABCs with practical revocation have recently been proposed by Hajny
and Malina [5]. Their ABCs make use of different discrete logarithm
representations of a fixed value. Although this technique is attractive
as the verification of a particular issuer’s credentials is easy, it has an
intrinsic weakness. Colluding users can efficiently forge new credentials
that are indistinguishable from legally issued ones.
Keywords: attribute-based credentials, revocation, cryptanalysis, dis-
crete logarithm representation
1 Introduction
Much research has focused on attribute-based credentials (ABCs) and possib-
ilities for their revocation in particular [2,3,6]. The main problem boils down
to the fact that when verifying non-identifying attributes, credentials should be
completely unlinkable, whereas revocation requires by definition some sort of
(escrowed) linkability of credentials.
Hajny and Malina [5] propose a new construction for revocable ABCs. The
basic idea is that credentials are distinct discrete logarithm representations (DL-
REPs) of the same fixed value; one of the components in such a DL-REP is used
for the revocation. Credentials can only be created by the Issuer, or by the
revocation authority (RA) in the proposal, who knows the corresponding secret
key. Since the public key is the fixed value, anyone can verify that a DL-REP is
indeed a valid credential, while new DL-REPs can only be created by the RA.
In this paper we do not discuss how the actual issuing and revocation protocols
work as they are not relevant to the weakness described here.
In the following section we describe an attack that shows that it is possible
to create new credentials without knowing the RA’s private key. In fact, any
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group of at least two users can create a virtually infinite number of new valid
credentials. We note that the authors mention that the security of their scheme
relies on the tamper resistance of the card. While this is often an acceptable
assumption, it is desirable to offer as much cryptographic protection as possible.
Moreover, the damage should be proportional to the committed act; that is,
compromising two cards should not undermine the security of the whole system.
2 DL-REPs, and how to create them
The concept of a DL-REP was introduced by Brands [1]. Let G be a finite group
of prime order q. If A =
∏k
i=1 g
xk
k , then (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Z
k
q is the DL-REP of A
with respect to generators g1, . . . , gk ∈ G.
Let gi = g
yi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} where G = 〈g〉. Then
A =
k∏
i=1
gxii = g
∑
k
i=1
xiyi ∈ G.
The ability to create a DL-REP of a value with respect to (gi)i=1,...,k without
knowing exponents (yi)i∈{1,...,k} is equivalent to the ability of breaking the dis-
crete logarithm assumption.
However, if one knows two DL-REPs of the same value, one can compute
many new DL-REPs. Indeed, let A =
∏k
i=1 g
xi
i =
∏k
i=1 g
xˆi
i , where (x1, . . . , xk) 6=
(xˆ1, . . . , xˆk). (That is, at least one entry is different, which also happens to mean
that at least two entries are different.) Then we get that (x1− xˆ1, . . . , xˆk− xˆk) 6=
(0, . . . , 0). Applying this inequality to the given DL-REPs of A, we get a non-
trivial DL-REP (i.e., not all zeros) of 1 in the group G: 1 =
∏k
i=1 g
xi−xˆi
i and for
any α ∈ Zq, 1 = 1
α =
∏k
i=1 g
α(xi−xˆi)
i . So, one can generate q different DL-REPs
of 1: (α(x1 − xˆ1), . . . , α(xk − xˆk)). Consequently, A has q different DL-REPs
(where α = 0 and α = q − 1 correspond to the initial DL-REPs):
A = 1 ·A = 1α · A =
k∏
i=1
g
α(xi−xˆi)
i ·
k∏
i=1
gxii =
k∏
i=1
g
xi+α(xi−xˆi)
i ∈ G.
3 The collusion attack
Hajny and Malina [5] propose a DL-REP-based credential revocation technique.
The underlying mathematical structure is not a prime group as in [5] but a
composite group G in which the discrete logarithm problem is trapdoor one-way
(by Okamoto and Uchiyama [7]). This enables the RA to take discrete logarithms
which plays an important role during issuance and revocation. Since the trapdoor
functionality does not affect the attack, we do not consider it further.
Each attribute has its own key pair in the system. The public key is a value
Aseed ∈ G, the private key, only known to the RA, consists of the prime factors
of the composite modulus n = p2q. We consider here only one attribute, but the
description and the attack can easily be generalised to multiple attributes.
Users are assumed to have smart cards to perform trusted computations for
the users. During the issuing phase, two random values x1, x2 (from the set of
possible exponents) are chosen by the card and x3 is computed by the RA such
that the master key (x1, x2, x3) is a DL-REP of the value Aseed with respect
to three public generators (g1, g2, g3). The values x1, x2 are private to the user,
they are not disclosed at issuance or verification. The RA can compute x3 from
A′seed = g
x1
1 g
x2
2 mod n (without learning x1, x2) using its secret key (the prime
factors of n) as it can compute the discrete logarithm x3 of Aseed/A
′
seed in G
with respect to g3. Since x3 is known to the RA this value can be used to revoke
the credential.
The authors claim that the system is secure: “Users are stuck with their
keys and they are unable to compute other valid keys”. However, they do not
consider the problem of colluding users in their model. Applying the technique
from the previous section, any two colluding users can make as many master keys
as they want. Assuming that two users have (different) secret keys (x1, x2, x3)
and (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3), for any α (from the possible set of exponents):
Aseed = g
x1+α(x1−xˆ1)
1 g
x2+α(x2−xˆ2)
2 g
x3+α(x3−xˆ3)
3 mod n.
Therefore, they can create new DL-REPs (x1+α(x1− xˆ1), x2+α(x2− xˆ2), x3+
α(x3− xˆ3)) of Aseed with respect to (g1, g2, g3), that is, they can forge new valid
credentials. The resulting exponent of g3 is completely random, it cannot be
traced back to either of the credentials and can easily be chosen in such a way
that it is not yet on any revocation list. Note that the attack itself is independent
of the trapdoor functionality, it works in any group where the discrete logarithm
problem is hard for the users.
4 Discussion
We have described a collusion attack against the Hajny–Malina scheme [5] that
does not even require any exponentiations from users after they learnt the mas-
ter keys from their smart cards. They can forge a virtually infinite number of
untraceable credentials. It is interesting to consider why the security analysis
overlooked this security problem.
The authors worked in a special group [7] in which the discrete logarithm
(DL) problem is a trapdoor one-way function. Knowing a trapdoor enables a
party to compute DL with respect to any base. Since hardness of the DL-REP
problem relies on the hardness of the DL problem, the DL-REP problem is also
just conditionally hard in this group. In their security proof, the authors state
that “it is hard to compute integers a, b such that 1 ≡ gacb mod n” where
a, b 6= 0. There are two problems worth mentioning. First, this weakness has
nothing to do with the trapdoor functionality of the group which enables the
computation of the discrete logarithm. Second, the theorem does not consider
the case when not only g, c, n are known but also at least one pair (aˆ, bˆ) for which
1 ≡ gaˆcbˆ mod n. In practice, this additional information is often provided; e.g.,
one master key gets revealed. Assuming that (aˆ, bˆ) is a solution for the equation
above, any scalar multiple of it is also a solution. Furthermore, two such linearly
independent pairs allows us to compute all possible solutions (a, b).
A possible solution for the problem described here is to use only a restricted
set of all DL-REPs of a fixed value as credentials. Such DL-REPs would include
some additional non-linear relation among the exponents. Even though users can
then compute new DL-REPs, they cannot produce new valid credentials. This
notion is closely related to authentication; the RA does not only give a simple
DL-REP, but one that authentically belongs to it.
5 Conclusion
A security proof that reduces a problem to another one has to carefully model
reality with practical attacks in mind. Even if a proof is correct, a simple—
and often practical—modification of the model (input values, in particular) can
destroy the security of the scheme. We showed that an additional input vector
makes the scheme in [5] insecure and credentials easily forgeable. The assumption
that the secret key never leaves the smart card is too strong considering that
the corruption of only two cards destroys the security of the whole system.
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